心靈哲學(xué)視角下人工智能體犯罪之否定闡釋

摘要：人工智能體作為刑法主體的可行性在法學(xué)界爭議頗多，通過心靈哲學(xué)的角度，引入塞爾中文屋和查莫斯哲學(xué)僵尸概念，從人工智能體萌芽時期到近期呼聲極高的ChatGPT等事務(wù)，分析梳理行為主義和圖靈測試的缺陷，從而對人工智能自由意志屬性做出否定判斷，進(jìn)而建議取消其作為刑法主體前提。

關(guān)鍵詞：人工智能體；心靈哲學(xué)；圖靈測試；哲學(xué)僵尸；自由意志

中圖分類號：D924.3文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識碼：A文章編號：2095-6916（2024）05-0081-04

Negative Elaboration of Artificial Intelligence Body’s Criminal Offenses

from the Perspective of Philosophy of Mind

Huo Nannan

（Hebei University of Engineering， Handan 056001）

Abstract： The feasibility of artificial intelligence body as the subject of criminal law is controversial in the legal academy， through the perspective of philosophy of mind， introducing the concept of Selwyn Chinese house and Chalmers philosophical zombie， from the budding period of artificial intelligence body to the recent call for the ChatGPT and other affairs， analysing and sorting out the defects of behaviourism and the Turing test， so as to make a negative judgement on the attribute of free will of the artificial intelligence， and then suggesting to abolish it as the subject premise of criminal law.

Keywords： artificial intelligence body; philosophy of mind; the Turing test; philosophical zombies; free will

2006年，隨著AI教父杰弗里·辛頓提出深度學(xué)習(xí)的概念，人工智能發(fā)展進(jìn)入了快車道，工業(yè)界將之轉(zhuǎn)化為社會生產(chǎn)生活一部分的趨勢日漸增強。（剩余5873字）